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NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-EFFECT OF NaN-REGISTRATION OF
AUTOMOBILE-Defendant X owned a non-registered automobile which was
parked on a public way by defendant Y, an agent of X. The keys were left in the
car in violation of a statute.1 Later in the same day the car was stolen. Plaintiff, a
pedestrian, was injured by the thief's negligent operation of the car. In an action
to recover for the injury, a verdict was directed for defendants. On appeal, held,
affirmed. As a matter of law, defendant's action in allowing a non-registered
automobile containing its keys to remain on a public way was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. Galbraith. v. Levin, Galbraith v. Cohen, (Mass. 1948)
81 N.E. (2d) 560.2
In many states, including Massachusetts, when keys are left in a registered
car parked on a public way, in violation of a statute, the owner is not liable to
persons injured by the negligent driving of a thief who has stolen the car, because
violation of the statute is not considered the proximate cause of the injury.8 It
is difficult to see why the owner's failure to comply with a registration statute

Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) 1932, c. 90, § 13.
The principal case overruled Malloy v. Newman, 3 IO Mass. 269, 37 N.E. (2d)
1001 (1941), which involved very similar facts.
8 Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E. (2d) ,330 (1945); one of the most
recent cases so holding is Wannebo v. Gates, (Minn. 1948) 34 N.W. (2d) 695. See 46
M1cH. L. REv. 271 (1947) for an analysis of the duty and causation problems involved
in this type of case, and 158 A.L.R. 1374 (1945), where it is stated that some states
let the jury determine whether the criminal act of the intermeddler or the negligence of
the owner is the proximate cause of the injury.
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should alter the result. In order to found a cause of action for negligence on the
breach of a statutory requirement, the plaintiff must show that he was in the
class which the statute was intended to protect,4 and that the injury he suffered
was one which the statute was intended to prevent. 5 Courts are justified in finding
a statutory duty to highway users and pedestrians when the legislative intent is to
prevent automobiles which do not meet prescribed standards of operating fitness
from using the highways. 6 In general, however, it is held that registration statutes
create no duty to this class of persons,7 being enacted primarily for revenue and
identification purposes,8 with a view to the control and preventiol). of theft.9
Registration cannot affect the proficiency of the driver or the mechanical performance of the car; hence there is little justification for a finding of negligence
in mere non-registration. Assuming, however, that non-registration is evidence
of negligence, the plaintiff must show that violation of the statute was the proximate cause of his injury.10 The human and physical elements which contribute
to an injury are not affected by mere non-registration, so that no direct causal
chain can be established. Moreover, where the causation is indirect, it should
be particularly clear that a condition of non-registration does not affect foreseeability of intervening acts or of harm. It follows, therefore, that liability should
not be founded on non-registration in negligence cases even in the absence of
criminal intervention. The majority of jurisdictions do not attnbute any causal
significance to non-registration.11 The principal case reaches the same result
where there is criminal intervention, refusing to extend the consequence of
non-registration, which would warrant liability in this jurisdiction in the absence
of the intervening criminal act. This case may mark the beginning of a revaluation
of the basis of the Massachusetts decisions 12 in the light of the above analysis.

Richard B. Gushee

PROSSER, ToRTS, 266 (1941).
De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 N.Y. 350, 179 N.E. 764 (1932).
6 Gonchar v. Kelson, II4 Conn. 262, 158 A. 545 (1932).
7 PROSSER, ToRTS, 266 (1941). A much better argument for the creation of a duty
can be based on statutes which require specific measures to be taken when leaving an
automobile unattended. See note 2, supra.
8 Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co., 201 Minn. 44, 275 N.W. 416 (1937).
9 Anderson v. Commercial Credit Co., ~IO Mont. 333, IOI P. (2d) 367 (1940).
10 Gonchar v. Kelson, II4 Conn. 262, 158 A. 545 (1932).
11 See, 163 A.L.R. 1375 (1946).
12 ln Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry. Co., 202 Mass. 443 at 446, 89 N.E. 25
(1909), the court recognized the distinction between unlawful acts which are merely
attendant conditions and those which are contributing causes, but refused to apply the
distinction because the automobile was " .•• a peculiar kind of vehicle which has only
recently come into use ..•." It is submitted that this reason no longer has the strength
it had in I 909.
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